One such implication is that cross-cultural psychological assessment continues to . Group differences may be due to mea- surement bias and not to real .. ( ) investigated the relationship of self-awareness, self regulation, .. The most prominent influence here is the use of display rules in emotional regulation. Inglehart identified two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation: existence —or absence—of values but also probe their modes of expression and the relationships, trade- In fact, putatively conflicting values may be the rule rather than . Frosh and Pinchevski (), I have previously analyzed photo-based meme. This study uses meme templates as a lens for exploring cultural The nearest parallels are cross-cultural studies about jokes (Davies, ; .. They first dictate certain expressive uses, for example, the unwritten rule spread across all . Mapping expressive differences around the world: The relationship.
One example of these complementary processes is fashion. New fashions such as street clothing coming from a small subculture, or the seasonal innovations of fashion designers may initially appeal because of their novelty, and then spread through conformity. The nonconformist bias is postulated to explain the observation that people sometimes prefer to copy cultural forms simply because they are rare. Model-dependent biases the second class of context biases mentioned above also promotes the imitation of rare forms.
In these biases, people selectively copy specific members of a social group. We tend to copy those who are skilled, those who are successful, and those who hold high prestige. The prestige bias is the most surprising, because instrumental reasoning alone could lead us to copy people who are skillful or successful.
Prestige is not synonymous with dominance. We do not necessarily hold those who dominate us in high regard, and we do not seek to look at them, be near them, or be like them. We do all of these things with high prestige individuals, and this tendency goes beyond our bias to copy people who are skilled in domains that we are trying to master.
Henrich and Gil White review a large body of empirical evidence in support of this conclusion. For example, many people will shift attitudes towards experts, even when the experts have no expertise on the topic under consideration; people will copy the task-performance style of a professionally attired individual more often than they copy the style of a college student; and groups of high-status individuals exert more influence on dialect changes over time.
Within the anthropological literature, it has often been noted that high prestige individuals in small-scale societies are listened to more than others, even on topics that have little to do with the domain in which their prestige was earned. Imitating prestigious individuals may confer advantages similar to imitating people who are skillful or successful, however.
Doing so may increase the likelihood of acquiring prestige-enhancing traits. Given the wide variety of biases, it may seem like a difficult task to figure out whom to imitate on any given occasion. This is especially daunting in cases where two biases conflict, as with conformity and prestige. To solve this problem, McElreath et al.
For example, conformity may be the default choice when payoffs in a group of models are similar, but prestige bias kicks in when the payoff differential increases. It is said to involve nurture rather than nature. Anthropologists emphasize the wide-ranging flexibility of human behavior and regard cultural transmission as evidence for that.
This might suggest that cultural transmission operates in a way that is independent of biology. But this idea has been challenged. One challenge comes from evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychologists place greater emphasis on innate capacities. Cultural variation may appear to be inconsistent with nativism, but evolutionary psychologists believe that some variation can be explained within a nativist framework.
They admit that human groups differ in both their psychological states and customs, but deny that such variation requires a social explanation. We may be evolved with inner toggles that make us act in ways that are adaptive to different settings. For example, cultures that struggle with resource scarcity may be more belligerent than those that live in places of abundance, and it is possible that this personality difference hinges on an innate switch that changes position in an environment-sensitive way.
The idea of evoked culture challenges the dichotomy between environmental and evolved causes of behavior, by proposing that some ontogenetically acquired traits result from natural selection. But critics of evolutionary psychology note that evoked culture cannot explain the relatively open-ended nature of human innovation.
Scarcity may trigger a biological disposition for belligerence, but does not cause us to invent canons, peace treaties, or agriculture. Those specific tools for coping with scarcity depend on insight and toil, rather than innate knowledge. That dichotomy between biology and culture has been challenged in ways that are less radical than the idea of evoked culture.
Indeed, one challenge pushes in the opposite direction; rather than saying cultural traits are innate, some say that innate traits depend on culture. Some species change their environment in a way that alters evolutionary trajectories Day et al. But some niche construction is cultural. New inventions can lead to new environments that have biological impact.
For example, Simoons argues that adult humans were all initially lactose intolerant, but acquired the ability to digest lactic acid as a consequence of technologies of dairy production. If so, culture can drive genetic change. A more controversial example is language. Language is socially transmitted and may have been invented, securing its status as a cultural item, but, if nativists are night, it is now transmitted by specialized innate machinery, which makes it bio-cultural.
The idea that we can acquire traits from biology and culture, and that these two interact, has been called dual-inheritance theory by Boyd and Richerson Dual-inheritance theory suggests that cultural evolution need not be an alternative to biological evolution, but rather, can interact with it. In some cases, cultural changes may actually exert a biological force. On the other hand, cultural evolution may tend to reduce the impact of biology. Consider niche construction again. If human beings can alter their environments through technology, they can mitigate the effects of external variables that might otherwise drive natural selection Laland et al.
Thus, the capacity for cultural learning may render biological transformations unnecessary. Cultural change is faster, more flexible, and driven by forethought. The extent to which biology contributes to human variation across cultures is, therefore, a matter of controversy.
Evolutionary psychologists emphasize the biological contributions to variation, dual-inheritance theorists emphasize bio-cultural interactions, and their critics suggest that the human capacity for cultural transmission reduces the import of biology. The latter perspective gains some support from the fact that many dramatic cultural differences have no known biological causes or effects. Examples of Cultural Influence Philosophers have long speculated about cultural variation, raising questions about whether people in different cultures differ psychologically.
Clearly people in different cultures know different things, believe different things, and have different tastes. But one might also wonder whether culture can influence the way we think and experience the world. And one might wonder whether differences in taste are a superficial veneer over underlying normative universals, or whether, instead, culture plays a role in shaping normative facts.
Cognitive science offers empirical insights into cultural differences that have been taken to bear on these enduring questions. What follows is a survey of some areas in which empirical investigation has been very active. Within this context, the study of language principally involved radical translation—attempting to translate the vocabulary of another language when there is no bilingual interpreter to tell you what words mean.
Anthropologists observing this practice, such as Franz Boas, were struck by how different the world's languages can be, and they began to wonder whether these differences pointed toward differences in how cultural groups understand the world.
Philosophers entered into such speculation too. Quine famously used the activity of radical translation as a springboard to present his theses about limits on a theory of meaning. When trying to construct a translation manual for a foreign language based on verbal behavior, there is a problem of underdetermination.
Absent any resolution of this underdetermination, there would always be a degree of indeterminacy in our theories of what other language users mean. Quine's behaviorism led him to think that these indeterminacies are not merely epistemic; linguistic behavior is not just evidence for what people mean, but the source of meaning, so there is no further fact that can settle what people mean by their words.
This led Quine to be skeptical about the role of reference in his semantic theory, but he didn't become a meaning nihilist. Without determinate reference, the meaning of words can be understood in terms of inferential roles. Thus, the meaning of a word depends, for Quine, on the total role of that word in its language; Quine is a meaning holist.
In the context of radical translation, this raises a striking philosophical possibility. When we encounter a word in another language, we cannot determine what it refers to, so we must specify its meaning in terms of its total inferential role; but inferential roles vary widely across cultural groups, because beliefs diverge; thus, the meaning of a word in a language spoken by one cultural group is unlikely to have an exact analogue in other languages.
Meanings vary across cultures. In this sense, radical translation is actually impossible. One cannot translate a sentence in another language, because one cannot find synonymous sentence in one's own.
At best, one can write paragraph- chapter- or book-length gloss on inferential links that help convey what foreign speakers mean by their words. This conjecture leads quickly to another that relates even more directly to psychology. Many philosophers have assumed a close relationship between language and concepts. Words are sometimes said to constitute concepts and, more often, to express them. Corresponding to the linguistic inferential roles that constitute meanings for Quine, one might posit isomorphic conceptual roles, and, if meanings are not shared, then it might follow that concepts are not either: The idea that languages may not be intertranslatable suggests that there may also be incommensurable conceptual schemes.
This idea is challenged by Davidsonwho offers a kind of dilemma. Suppose we encounter a group whose beliefs and linguistic behaviors differ from ours but can nevertheless be accurately characterized with patience and time. If we can understand these other people, then their concepts must be shared with ours. Suppose, however, that we cannot ever understand what they mean by their words because they say things that can be offered no coherent translation. Then it's best to assume they are not really saying anything at all; their words are meaningless noises.
Either way, there is no proliferation of conceptual schemes. Davidson's argument, which is only roughly presented here, controversially presupposes a principle of charity, according to which we should not attribute irrational e.
Davidson may also be overly demanding in requiring accurate translation between languages as opposed to some weaker criterion of comprehension see Bar-On ; Henderson Well before Quine and Davidson were debating the incommensurability of meanings, linguists had been exploring similar ideas. Edward Sapira student of Boaz, had proposed two interrelated theses: Together, these two theses entail linguistic relativity: For example, Whorf speculates that speakers of Hopi are anti-realists about time, since tense in that language is expressed using epistemic modals, which describe events as recalled, reported, or anticipated, in lieu of past, present, or future.
Sapir and Whorf's relativism about language has come to be known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. These two have been criticized for offering insufficient support. They had limited knowledge of the languages they discuss, and throughout their discussions, they infer cognitive differences directly from linguistic differences rather than testing whether language causes or even correlates with difference in thought. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis went out of fashion with the advent of Chomskyan linguistics.
Chomsky argued that linguistic differences are superficial and scientifically uninteresting. Languages are united by a universal grammar, and differences simply reflect different settings in universally shared rules.
A further setback for the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis came with early testing. Heider set out to see whether color vocabulary influenced color perception. Heider found that the Dani divide color space in much the same way as English speakers, and performed like English speakers on color memory tests.
There was also a failed effort to show that Chinese speakers, who lack a counterfactual construction, have difficulty with subjunctive thought Bloom ; Au Evidence for psychological differences across speakers of distinct languages were hard to come by. More recently, however, some researchers have claimed to find such differences.
Lucyfor example, found that speakers of Yucatec Mayan, a language that lacks count nouns, made errors on memory tasks that required keeping track of specific quantities of items. When performing spatial tasks, such as replicating a sequence of objects in two different locations, they preserved the arrangement relative to absolute coordinates even in conditions where English speakers would use relative coordinates.
Even color perception, which was once regarded as immune to Sapir-Whorf effects may be influenced by language. Kay and Kempton found that speaker Tarahumara, a language that does not distinguish green and blue, were more accurate than English speakers at rating the similarity of color pairs within the blue-green range see also Roberson et al. In categorical perception, differences between stimuli that cross a categorical boundary are perceived as greater than equal differences within a category.
For Russian speakers, a light and medium blue may look more different than a light and dark blue, even if two pairs are equidistant in colorspace. Speakers of Spanish and German associate stereotypically gendered adjectives with common nouns as a function of the gender of those nouns in their languages, even when they are tested in English. German speakers may describe keys as hard, heavy, and useful, while Spanish speakers describe them as lovely, little, and intricate. These kinds of findings are now plentiful, but the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis has not gone unchallenged for a review, see Bloom and Keil For example, Li and Gleitman showed that Tzetal speakers can reproduce object arrays using relative reference frames in a simplified version of the experiments performed by Pederson et al.
Such experimental critiques suggest that Sapir-Whorf effects are fragile, and may be hard to show under certain conditions, but they also confirm that language plays a role in encoding information, and cognitive differences arise when memory is involved.
Studies on color perception and color comparison suggest that the effects are not limited to memory, and Boroditsky's study of gendered pronouns suggest that language can have an enduring impact on how we think about familiar categories.
In summary, it might be said that cognitive science has found evidence in support of the hypothesis that language can influence thought. Because language is a cultural item, linguistic effects on thought can be characterized as cultural effects.
But the interest of such effects is open to debate. Neo-Whorfians will say that language can establish modes of thinking that distinguish one group from another, while critics say these differences are modest and don't imply the radically incommensurable worldviews advertised by Whorf. But language is not the only way that a culture can influence cognition.
Other research looks for cultural differences in language and perception that are not necessarily mediated by language. For example, there is research suggesting that cognition can be affected by methods of subsistence or social values. Field-dependent thinkers tend to notice context and the relationship between things, whereas field-independent thinkers tend to abstract away from context and experience objects in a way that is less affected by their relationships to other things.
For example, field-independent thinkers do better on what Witkin called the embedded figure task, in which one shape left must be found embedded in another right. Witkin's test was designed to study individual differences within his own culture, but Berry realized that it could also be used to investigate cultural variation.
He was interested in how different forms of subsistence might influence cognition. One hypothesis is that hunters and gatherers must be good at differentiating objects plants or prey from complex scenery. Horticulturalists, on the other hand, must pay close attention to the relationship between the many environmental factors that can influence growth of a crop.
To test this, Berry studied Inuit hunters and Temne horticulturalists in Africa, and found that the latter are more field-dependent than the former. See also Segall et al. Cultures of every size differ on a number of dimensions.
One distinction that has been extremely valuable in cross-cultural research is the contrast between individualist cultures and collectivist cultures see Triandis, Individualists place emphasis on individual achievements and goals; they value autonomy and disvalue dependency on others. Collectivists place emphasis on group membership and often value group cohesion and success above personal achievement.
Following Triandis, we can define more precisely as follows: For example, when asked to pick a colored pen from an array of pens, individualists tend to pick the most unusual color, and collectivists tend to pick the most common. Individualist and collectivist cultures are distributed widely across the globe. It should be obvious that these are vast and remote regions of the globe and highly diverse, culturally speaking.
Any large nation, such as India or America, will have scores of subcultures each of which might vary along these dimensions. The point is not that all collectivist cultures are alike. Differences between collectivist cultures and within collectivist cultures are often greater than between collectivist and individualist cultures.
The point is simply that collectivist cultures share this one dimension of similarity, and that dimension, as we will see, has an impact on cognitive style. Future research will offer more finely grained distinctions, but at present, research on the cognitive effects of individualism and collectivism offers some of the strongest evidence for cultural differences in thought.
Some researchers trace individualism and collectivism to material conditions. For example, many Western cultures are individualistic and trace their seminal cultural influence to ancient Greece, which had an economy based on fishing and herding. Far Eastern countries trace their seminal cultural influence to China, which had intensive agriculture.
Cross cultural relationships - dealing with differences.
In the West, free mercantilism and capitalism emerged long ago, emphasizing individual achievement. In the East, capitalism and free trade is comparatively new.
Once these differences are in place, they tend to be reflected in many other aspects of culture. Far Eastern languages use characters that require a fine sensitivity to relationships between parts; Eastern religion often focuses on relationships between human beings and nature; Eastern ethical systems often emphasize responsibilities to the family Nisbett, These cultural differences can be used to transmit and preserve psychological differences from generation to generation.
Nisbett and his collaborators mostly East Asian psychologists talk about field-dependence and field-independence, but also introduce the closely related terms: They postulate that, as collectivists, East Asians will process information more holistically, seeing the relation between things, and collectivists will process information more analytically, focusing on individual agents and objects.
They show that these differences come out in a wide variety of psychological tasks. Here are some examples reviewed by Nisbett. Westerns are more likely than Easterners to attribute a person's behavior to an internal trait rather than an environmental circumstance. In many cases, such attributions are mistaken social psychologists call this the Fundamental Attribution Error.
Easterners are more likely to see both sides of a conflict when faced with counter-arguments in a debate; Westerners dig in their heels. The Eastern responses are more dialectical, whereas Westerners are guided by the principle of Non-Contradiction.
This is a principle central to modern logic in the West, which asserts that a claim and its negation can't both be right. Westerners tend to categorize objects based on shared features cows go with chickens because they are both animalswhereas Easterners focus more on relationships between objects cows go with grass, because cows eat grass. When looking at a fish tank, Westerners first notice the biggest, fastest fish and ignore the background.
Easterners are more likely to notice background features and relational events a fish swimming past some seaweedand they are less likely to recall individual fish on a memory test. In studies of expectations, Westerns tend to expect things to remain the same, whereas Easterners are more likely to expect change.
In assessing the import of these differences, it is important to realize that they are often subtle. But the results show that there are predictable and replicable differences in default cognitive styles as a function of culture. Several philosophical ramifications deserve note.
First, variation in cognitive styles can be used to challenge the idea that the rules used in thought are fixed by a hard-wired mental logic. This idea was promulgated by Boole in his work on formal logic, and it helped pave the way for the advent of computing and, ultimately, for the computational theory of mind.
If there is no fixed mental logic, then the study of reasoning may owe more to nurture than has often been assumed, and the traditional computational theory of mind might even need a re-examination. Cultural differences do not refute computational approaches, but they raise a question: Second, variation in reasoning can also be used to raise questions about whether certain cognitive norms such as a preference for the principle of non-contradiction are culturally inculcated and contestable.
This issue is related to contemporary debates about whether classical logic is privileged. It was also the subject of a provocative paper by Winchwho, following ethnographic work by Evans-Pritchard on the logic of witchcraft among the Azanda, argued that the Western allegiance to bivalence is culturally contingent, rather than normatively compulsory.
Third, variation in perception raises questions about modularity; if values can influence how we see, then seeing may be more amendable to top-down influences than defenders of modularity have supposed. Citing work on the Mueller-Lyer illusion, Fodor argues that modularity is consistent with the possibility that cultural settings can, over protracted time periods, alter how information is processed.
But this concession may be inadequate: Moreover, unlike the Mueller-Lyer illusion, which may involve bottom-up perceptual learning, research on individualism and collectivism suggests that values can influence how we see. That's close in spirit to the idea that perception is theory-laden, which was the central thesis of New Look psychology—the theory that the modularity hypothesis is supposed to challenge Bruner, ; Hanson, Emotions Emotions are a fundamental feature of human psychology.
They are found in all cultures, and arguably, in all mammals. Indeed, we seem to share many emotions with other animals.
Dogs, for example, show signs of fear they cowersadness they cryand delight they wag their tails giddily. This suggests that emotions are evolved responses. The analysis focused on the formats, social identities, and emotional expressions found in memetic repertoires, revealing both global communalities and enclaves of cultural uniqueness. In conclusion we present three overarching tensions manifest in the global flows of memetic content.
According to his conception, a meme is a cultural unit that is spread from one person to another through copying and imitation. Recently, the term has been adopted to mark the more specific phenomenon of Internet memes: This dynamic locates Internet memes between individual and collective creation.
Memetic templates are essentially collective, as they are formulated among members of communities or groups with common cultural knowledge and affinities Burgess, In short, memes allow the individual to use a collectively created template to deliver a personalized message. Although the memetic sphere is continuously evolving and changing so that memes can be applied to communicate a diverse array of ideas, being template-based, they are still limited and thus limit those using them. In this sense, we suggest viewing Internet memes as an expressive repertoire, which is collectively authored and developed as a means of communication.
Meme templates can be seen as a parallel to langue; socially constructed and systematic, they create a binding structure for expression, while directing its range of possibilities.
Meme instances—specific items created and shared on the web—are thus the parole, an individual expression of a personal message that relies on social constructs and their structures.
Building on this idea, our comparative analysis of memetic templates aims to reveal such repertoires and the cultural choices and power relations that compose them. Memes can thus be analyzed as potential agents in processes of globalization.
Cross cultural relationships
At the same time, however, globalization is marked by inequality and favors the dominant and powerful West Pieterse, The implementation of such an analysis requires specific traceable components that align with those typifying memetic spread: While form is fairly simple to assess, content and stance are broader and thus required a more concrete formulation. As detailed below, we used two categories as our analytical focuses: Memes and social identities Representation of social identities has been widely discussed as a pivotal aspect of cultural products.
These hegemonic patterns of representation persist throughout various media, cultures, and eras. Despite the early expectation from digital culture, multiple studies demonstrated the marginalization of women and ethnic minorities in these spheres Herring, ; Marwick, ; Nakamura, While spaces that constitute an alternative to this conservative regime are available and are often celebrated, dominant groups still keep their positions in the mainstream of digital culture.
Studies of memes in English have detected patterns similar to those shown in the aforementioned studies of traditional and digital media. Milner noted that the principal population behind the creation and dissemination of Internet memes are young, Caucasian, middle-class men, a tendency that has been reaffirmed quantitatively by Segev et al. This study aims to broaden our understanding of the ways in which social categories are constructed by Internet memes in two senses.
First, while previous studies observed primarily Western cultural products, the question of representation has not been answered in regard to memes in other cultures. Second, by focusing on meme templates we aimed to look not only at issues that relate to representation content but also at questions pertaining to the positions stances invoked when portraying certain identities.
As Milner noted, part of what makes a meme propagate is its ability to resonate with individuals on both the personal and societal levels.
Similarly, Miltner claimed that participants perform emotion through memetic formats and use them to add context to their messages, especially when the content is negative or difficult. In addition to memes being emotional conduits for individuals, their communal expression impacts collectives.
Emotional properties of memes are, therefore, meaningful for both individuals and for collectives, as they facilitate communal arenas of affect-based discourse. Focusing on the expression of emotions, it was found that individualistic cultures were more emotionally expressive and more positive in their emotions Matsumoto et al. However, this prominent research trajectory has been contested. Our study takes a middle ground approach toward this body of work: Another axis underlying the analysis of emotions in memes relates to the differentiation between mainstream and subcultural digital spheres, which can be associated with positive and negative emotions respectively.
Of course, this does not mean that all user-generated content is emotionally positive; the mainstream and common norms may have a positive bias, but many examples of negativity are available.
Internet memes and the communities that devised much of the logic governing current meme use are themselves such an example. As Milner discovered, memes often deal with social success and failure. It should be noted, however, that these subcultural roots of memetic culture, although fundamental in the inception of memes and still influential, are not necessarily the face of meme use as a whole.
These notions about emotions and affect inform our examination of cross-cultural memes in two ways, corresponding with the dualities that guide our analysis. Seeing the world through the lenses of one's own people or culture so that own culture always looks best and becomes the pattern everyone else should fit into. Some experts hold that the custom of exogamy originated from a scarcity of women, which forced men to seek wives from other groups, e.
Another viewpoint ascribes the origin of exogamy to totemism, and claim that a religious respect for the blood of a totemic clan, led to exogamy. When we go to another country to live, we become expatriates or expats for short.
Extended families are very common in collectivistic cultures. This is the opposite of the nuclear family. Fascism is characterised by totalitarian attempts to impose state control over almost all aspects of life: The fascist state also regulates and controls the means of production and takes all investment decisions.
What is considered good manners in one culture can be considered a faux pas in another. For example, in Western societies it is usually considered a friendly gesture to bring a bottle of wine when invited to someone's house for dinner.
French hosts may consider this insulting as it implies that the hosts are unable to serve their own good wine. Hofstede defines this dimension as follows: The majority of the population were engaged in subsistence agriculture while simultaneously having an obligation to fulfil certain duties for the landholder.
The term 'glass ceiling' describes the process by which women are barred from promotion by means of an invisible barrier. Gentrification may be small-scale and incremental i. Docklands and Notting Hill in London. The earth's inhabitants will lose their individual cultural diversity and one culture will remain for all the people.
The term glocalization emphasizes that the globalization of a product is more likely to succeed when the product or service is adapted specifically to each locality or culture it is marketed in. Glocalization as a term first appeared in the late s in articles by Japanese economists in the Harvard Business Review. First English usage is by the British sociologist Roland Robertson. An example of glocalization in practice: Hallall communication verbal as well as nonverbal is contextually bound.
What we do or do not pay attention to is largely dictated by cultural contexting. In low-context cultures, the majority of the information is explicitly communicated in the verbal message. In high-context cultures the information is embedded in the context. High- and low-context cultures also differ in their definition of social and power hierarchies, relationships, work ethics, business practices, time management.
Low-context cultures tend to emphasize the individual while high-context cultures places more importance on the collective. The term originates from agriculture and has for a long time been strongly related to pejorative concepts of racism and racial purity from western colonial history. These can exist on different scales e. Other terms for indigenous peoples include aborigines, native peoples, first peoples, Fourth World, first nations and autochthonous this last term having a derivation from Greek, meaning "sprung from the earth".
This includes at least distinct peoples in over 72 countries. He defines this dimension as: Closed views see Islam as static and unchanging, as primitive, sexist, aggressive, and threatening. Closed views of Islam see hostility towards Muslims as 'normal' and are used to justify discrimination because no common values with other religions are admitted.
Central to closed views, or 'Islamophobia', and propagated by the Western media, is the assumption that all Muslims support all actions taken in the name of Islam. Open views see Islam as a diverse and progressive faith with internal differences, debates and developments. Recognising shared values with other faiths and cultures Islam is perceived to be equally worthy of respect.
Criticisms by the West are considered and differences and disagreements do not diminish efforts to combat discrimination while care is taken that critical views of Islam are not unfair and inaccurate. Typical symptoms are fatigue, insomnia.
The world has 24 time zones, one for each hour in the day.
A part of the brain called the hypothalamus acts as a kind of alarm clock to activate various body functions such as hunger, thirst, and sleep. It also regulates body temperature, blood pressure, and the level of hormones and glucose in the bloodstream. Thus, when the eye of an air traveler perceives dawn or dusk many hours earlier or later than usual, the hypothalamus may trigger activities that the rest of the body is not ready for, and jet lag occurs. Machistas firmly believe in the superiority of men over women and that women were created to stay home and be mothers and wives.
In many cultures, from Latin America to Korea and to countries of the Muslim world, machismo is acceptable and even expected male behaviour. In some cultures, membership of a specific group is inherited matrilineally. For example one is a Jew if one's mother rather than one's father is a Jew. Meme refers to any unit of cultural information, such as a cultural practice, idea or concept, which one mind transmits verbally or by demonstration to another mind.
Examples of cultural memes are thoughts, ideas, theories, opinions, beliefs, moods, poetry, habits, dance, tunes, catch-phrases, fashions, ways of building arches.
Memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process broadly called imitation very similarly how genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leading from body to body via sperm or eggs. Nowadays this term refers to openly competitive societies like the USA where large inequalities of income and wealth accrued by merit rather than birth is accepted. In contrast egalitarian societies like the Scandinavian countries aim to reduce such disparities of wealth.
Minorities may be separated by physical or cultural traits disapproved of by the dominant group and as a result often experience discrimination. Minorities may not always be defined along social, ethnic, religious or sexual lines but could be broad based e.
According to him, in monochronic cultures, people try to sequence actions on the "one thing at a time" principle. Interpersonal relations are subordinate to time schedules and deadlines. They have well-developed, increasingly knowledge-based and strongly interconnected manufacturing and service sectors that provide a significant proportion of employment and contribute to significant national and individual wealth.
In these countries indices such as literacy levels, incomes and quality of life are high and these countries exercise considerable political influence at the global scale. The United States is understood as a "mosaicmelting pot" of various and diverse cultures, as opposed to the single monolithic culture that results from the "" or assimilation model. Pluralism tends to focus on differences within the whole, while multiculturalism emphasizes the individual groups that make up the whole.
The term multiculturalism is also used to refer to strategies and measures intended to promote diversity.
Japan and Iceland could be two examples of near ideal nation-states": This draws attention to the culturalization of the economy in contrast to the economization of culture.